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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between fiscal federalism and
accountability in Nigeria. Corruption is a global plague and is endemic in nature. Several policies have been
adopted by the Nigerian Government to institutionalize accountability and combat the scourge of corruption
that have hindered socio-economic progress but to no avail.
Design/methodology/approach – Thus, this study examined fiscal federalism and accountability
issues in Nigeria using secondary data and used the auto-regressive distributed lag econometric technique to
analyse the data.
Findings – The results from this study reveal that fiscal federalism fails to mitigate corruption in the long
run in Nigeria because of poor bureaucratic quality (BQ) and ineffective law and order (LOR).
Social implications – Fiscal decentralization must be accompanied by legislations that will strengthen
BQ of fiscal institutions at subnational levels and promote effective LOR.
Originality/value – This study recommends that for fiscal federalism to mitigate corruption in the long
run, government must adopt appropriate policies to improve BQ and further strengthen LOR in Nigeria. The
finding also suggests that to promote public sector accountability in Nigeria, government should ensure the
simultaneous decentralization of expenditure and revenue to lower tiers of government. This study provides
detailed empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization without accountability will accentuate public sector
corruption, and in the long run, weaken local economic development initiative to boost growth and
development.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal federalism is the devolution of revenue powers and expenditure responsibilities to the
various tiers of government in a federation, while fiscal decentralization is the extent to
which taxing powers and expenditure responsibilities are devolved to subnational
government in a federation (Ewetan, 2012; Taiwo, 1999; Tanzi, 1995). Fiscal federalism, no
doubt, has become the centrepiece of national discourse in many countries that see
decentralization as a strategy for addressing the critical challenge of accountability (Ewetan
et al., 2015b; Aigbokhan, 1999). Fiscal decentralization is now globally accepted for a
number of reasons which include access to local information by local officials, promotion of
inter-jurisdictional competition and alignment of interest of local government officials with
preferences of local residents (Ma andMao, 2018; Oates, 1972).
Nigeria has been confronted with the plague of corruption, which began in the 1970s till
date with grave consequences for socio-political and economic development (Matthew et al.,
2020). Corruption is a global plague and is endemic in nature with a global average score of
43% and a major driver of poverty, inequality, insecurity, ethnic violence and denial of
fundamental human rights (Transparency International, 2015; Babajide et al., 2020).
Institutionalization of accountability to mitigate corruption is goal that has attracted the
attention of scholars, researchers, policymakers and development partners. Accountability
involves transparency, institutional and agency relationships, interactions between public
and non-public sectors and adequate monitoring mechanisms for execution of
responsibilities, reportage and evaluation. The development experiences of developed and
industrialized countries reveal that public sector accountability contributed significantly to
their successful development narratives. Also the rapid economic development miracle
recorded by the Asian Tigers within a short period confirms clearly that development
cannot be achieved without accountability. The institutional framework of government
whether federal or unitary in nature plays a significant role in addressing the issue of
accountability in the public sector and its interface with the private sector.
In the post-independence period from 1960 to 1966, Nigeria practised fiscal federalism
under a regional structure. During this period, the regions retained a significant proportion
of the revenue generated and remitted the rest to the Federal Government. This fiscal
arrangement promoted healthy competition among the regions, which spurred economic
development and structural transformation of the regions. Accountability was the hallmark
during this period as the regions made judicious use of the huge revenue they generated and
retained. The economic gains and structural transformation of the early post-independence
period was reversed when oil became the major foreign exchange earner and the military
with its unitary command structure and centric tendencies took control of governance in
1966 and totally abandoned fiscal federalism. The huge petrol dollar created a false sense of
economic prosperity, encouraged an over bloated fiscal structure through the creation of
more states to provide political jobs for the military boys and their cronies, progressively
destroyed accountability in public sector finances, enthroned public sector corruption and
decimated the economic fortune of Nigeria. There was complete reversal of the modest
regional economic achievements recorded during the first republic and till date Nigeria has
continued to grapple with the lack of accountability and enthronement of pervasive public
sector corruption. Thus, the significant economic progress made in the first republic has
made many to canvass for the adoption of fiscal federalism to address the issue of
accountability in Nigeria’s public sector.
Against this background, this paper therefore, seeks to examine the extent to which re-
introduction of fiscal federalism can help promote accountability in Nigeria. This study is
presented in six sections. Section 2 presents a review of related literature and the theoretical
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framework for the study. Section 3 discusses the choice of variables, sources of data, models
and estimation technique. Section 4 presents the results of estimated models. Section 5
discusses the results of the empirical analysis and implication of findings and Section 6
concludes the study.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
Fiscal federalism theory states that in a federation, each tier of government is supreme
within its defined delimited sphere and should also have appropriate taxing powers to
exploit its independent sources of revenue to enable it carry out assigned fiscal
responsibilities (Vincent, 2001; Wheare, 1963). It seeks to promote healthy
intergovernmental relations and synergy in a federation (Ewetan, 2011; Taiwo, 1999;
Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 1995).
In the empirical literature there is evidence that government in developing countries are
far more centralized than in the industrialized countries (Oates, 1993; Innocents, 2011). The
results of a study by Oates (1985) using a sample of 43 countries reveal an average share of
central government spending in total public expenditure of 65% in the subsample of 18
industrialized countries as contrasted to 89% in the subsample of 25 developing nations. In
terms of public revenues, the average share of central governments in the developing
countries was in excess of 90% confirming that central government in the developing
countries assumes the lion’s share of fiscal responsibility. The weakness of local
government in relation to central government in fiscal operations is one of the most striking
phenomena of underdeveloped countries (Martin and Lewis, 1956).
Findings in the empirical literature on the relationship between decentralization and
public sector accountability or corruption are mixed. Some studies find that decentralization
promotes greater public sector accountability and government responsiveness, encourages
local innovation in service provision, reduces corruption and improves regional balance in
development (Agyemang-Duah et al., 2018; Arif and Ahmad, 2018; Ewetan et al., 2015a;
Meloche and Vaillancourt, 2015; Zegras et al., 2013; Gurgur and Shah, 2002; Huther and
Shah, 1998; Arikan, 2004; De Mello and Barenstein, 2001). Other studies find that
decentralization leads to corruption especially at subnational level of governance in
developing countries (Bojanic, 2018; Fisman and Gatti, 2002). In a study on the impact of
fiscal decentralization on accountability, economic freedom and political and civil liberties in
the Americas, Bojanic (2018) finds that decentralization initially hampers but eventually
enhances accountability and political and civil liberties, in line with the hypothesized
positive correlation between greater fiscal autonomy and a more inclusive, participatory
government. In a study on the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty, Llorca-Rodríguez
et al. (2017) affirm that the issues of accountability, fiscal assignments and fiscal strategy
must be adequately addressed for fiscal decentralization to produce positive results in any
country.
In Nigerian case, a comparative study by Ekanade (2011) on fiscal federalism and
development in Nigeria and Canada posits that to overcome the challenge of accountability,
Nigeria must learn from the Canadian experience with respect to accountability in public
sector finances made possible by the culture of reverence for the constitution and the rule of
law in their intergovernmental financial relations. Other studies on Nigeria find that fiscal
centralization, mismatch between revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities and
predatory and politically motivated parameters of revenue allocation have contributed
significantly to lack of accountability in the public sector and economic and social
backwardness (Ewetan, 2012; Alabi, 2010; Nwede et al., 2013).
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Similarly, some studies find that the faulty federal structure and the abandonment of
fiscal federalism have promoted lack of accountability, corruption and violent struggle for
resource control by ethnic militias (Ewetan et al., 2015b; Daniel, 2015).
The literature review has revealed that the abandonment of fiscal federalism has
contributed to the progressive destruction of public sector accountability in Nigeria with
negative attendant consequences such as corruption, dysfunctional development and violent
struggle for resource control by ethnic militias. There is therefore an urgent need for the
government to address a number of issues such as fiscal laws that will ensure legal
framework for beneficial and dynamic intergovernmental fiscal relations, significant
devolution of fiscal powers and responsibilities to subnational government guided by the
principles of fiscal federalism and the nurturing of strong, transparent, efficient and
independent fiscal institutions that will ensure accountability, and that can address
proactively emerging fiscal challenges of the 21st century in the public sector.
There is no formalized theory that links fiscal federalism and accountability. The first
generation theory of fiscal federalism linked efficiency and equity in a federation to the
decentralization of expenditure responsibilities and centralization of revenue responsibilities.
The theory emphasized the importance and benefits of transfers of power for the purpose of
addressing the problems of vertical and horizontal imbalances observed in government. It
largely assumes that federating unit decision-makers are “benevolent” and can maximize the
social welfare, ignoring the weakness in sub-national government in most developing
countries (Jha, 2013; Rodden et al., 2003). The first generation theory of fiscal decentralization
was based on the decentralization theorem (Oates, 1999; Bird, 2009).
The decentralization theorem states that fiscal federalism promotes efficiency and
accountability in public sector service delivery because local authorities can be held
accountable for resources under their control (Oates, 1972; Ozo-Eson, 2005). Governments
and their officials were seen as the custodians of public interest and as a result are expected
to maximize social welfare through local outputs targeted at local demands at different
multi-layer of government (Oates, 1999; Bird, 2009; Ozo-Eson, 2005).
3. Choice of variables and data source
Description of data and source are presented in Table 1. The study used annual data on
study variables from 1981 to 2017 sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin
of Various Issues and International Country Risk Guide. To examine the link between fiscal
federalism and accountability, the study used corruption index (CI) as a proxy for
accountability. The study argues that where there is accountability, corruption will be
mitigated; this is the dependent variable. The study also argues that fiscal federalism,
bureaucratic quality (BQ) and law and order (LOR) will mitigate corruption and also
increase the honesty level. On the basis of this argument, the independent variables include
the three measures of fiscal decentralization (FDC1, FDC2 and FDC3); the other independent
variables are BQ and LOR. All the variables are presented in Table 1.
3.1 Model and estimation techniques
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between fiscal federalism and
accountability in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the following specific objectives are
investigated. Firstly, the study investigates the short- and long-run linkages between
accountability and fiscal federalism in Nigeria. Secondly, it analyses the causal relationship
between accountability andmeasures of fiscal federalism in Nigeria.
To estimate the error correction model (ECM), the unit root is carried out for the study






If the series is not stationary at level form, it could be stationary at the first difference form.
The study engaged the use of autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) cointegration approach
(Osabohien et al., 2017; Pesaran et al., 2001).
The implicit form of the model:
CI ¼ f ðFDC1; FDC2; FDC3; BQ; LORÞ (1)
CI = corruption perception index;
FDC1 = decentralization of taxing power;
FDC2 = decentralization of expenditure power;
FDC3 = simultaneous decentralization of both powers;
BQ = bureaucratic quality; and LOR = law and order.
The explicit form can be written as:




Variable Abbreviation Data description and source
Decentralization of
taxing power
FDC1 Measures the ratio of sub-national internally generated to total
federal revenue (SIGR/FGR)
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin Various Issues
Decentralization of
expenditure power
FDC2 Measures the ratio of sub-national expenditure to total federal
expenditure (SEX/FGE)




FDC3 Ratio of sub-national internally generated revenue to total
federal expenditure (SIGR/FGE)
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin Various Issues
Corruption index CI CI measures perceived level of corruption in a country on a scale
of 0–10 where 0 is highly corrupt and 10 is highly clean
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Bureaucratic quality
index
BQ Measures the perceptions of the degree and quality of public
services and civil service, freedom from political pressures, quality
of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of
government’s commitment to such policies on a scale of 0–10
where 0 is absence of quality and 10 is perfect quality
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Law and order index LOR Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of all forms of crime and
violence. It lies between 0 and 10, where 0 is absence of law and
order and 10 is perfect law and order
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Notes: CBN = Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin; FGR = Federal Government Revenue; SIGR =
sub-national internally generated revenue; SEX = sub-national expenditure; FGE = Federal Government
Expenditure; CI = corruption index
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Theoretically it is anticipated that the relationship between CI and fiscal decentralization
could be positive or negative. Theoretically, it is anticipated that BQ and LOR should have a
positive relationship with CI.
Themodel for the ARDL is specified as:



















r iDFDC3ti þ lECMti þ « t (3)
Where: D represents the change in operator; ECMti represents the error correction term;
and ƛ represents the rate of adjustment. The rate of adjustments means how fast the system
adjusts back to equilibrium in the event of distortion. The null hypothesis of no long-run
relationship (cointegration) is further tested. In the presence of cointegration, the estimated
equation will be super consistent and gives the long-run behaviour.
The hypothesis is stated thus:
H0. s ¼ b ¼ g ¼ d ¼ u ¼ r ¼ 0 (No long-run relationship exists).
H1. s 6¼ b 6¼ g 6¼ d 6¼ u 6¼ r 6¼ 0(There exists a long-run relationship).
ARDL cointegration approach has three main advantages over the normal cointegration
approach; the first one is that variables under survey does not necessarily be stationary at
the same order; the second advantage is that the ARDL method can be applied when the
variables are differently integrated that is, at levels [I (0)], or integrated at order one [I (1)], as
presented in Table 3. The third advantage is that the estimator obtained from ARDL model
tends to be more efficient (Osabohien et al., 2017; Pesaran et al., 2001). The requirement for
the use of ARDL are that none of the variables should be integrated of order 2 (1 (2)) and the
dependent variable has to be integrated of order 1.
4. Results
Table 2 presents the correlation analysis of the series used in this study, which shows the
pair relationship between the series. The emphasis is on the two dependent variables (GDP
per capita and CI). Table 2 shows a weak positive correlation between CI and revenue
decentralization (FDC1) and expenditure decentralization (FDC2) with 0.061 and 0.306,
respectively. However, a strong positive correlation with BQ index with the value of 0.568 is
seen. Table also reveals a weak negative correlation between CI and simultaneous
decentralization of revenue and expenditure (FDC3) and LOR with 0.814 and 0.087,
respectively. The correlation analysis therefore shows that the series used in this study is
not collinear.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the series used in the study. LOR has the
highest mean, followed by CI, BQ index, expenditure decentralization (FDC2), simultaneous
decentralization of revenue and expenditure (FDC3) and revenue decentralization (FDC1).
Likewise, LOR has the highest standard deviation and FDC1 has the lowest standard
deviation. With the exception of CI that is negatively skewed, all the remaining series are
positively skewed.
The unit root test was done using both the ADF approach and the breakpoint unit root
ADF test to deal with the issue of structural breaks of variables such as GDP per capita. The
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ADF test reported in Table 4 shows that FDC3 is integrated of order 0 at 5% significant
level, while the remaining series are integrated of order 1 at 5% significant level. The
dependent variable CI fulfils the requirement of ARDL as it is integrated of order 1 at 5%
significant level. The breakpoint unit root test reported in Table 5 also shows that BQ and
LOR are integrated of order 0 at 5% significant level while the remaining series which
includes CI is integrated of order 1 at 5% significant levels, thus confirming the ADF unit
test reported in Table 4. The ARDL technique as advanced by Pesaran et al. (2001) is
applicable if the study series are a combination of I(0) and I(1) and the order of integration is




CI FDC1 FDC2 FDC3 BQ LOR
Mean 1.6 0.054 0.345 0.086 1.172 2.02
Median 1.5 0.049 0.340 0.074 1.0 2.0
Maximum 2.0 0.147 1.150 0.181 2.0 3.0
Minimum 1.0 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.0 1.0
Std Dev. 0.37 0.035 0.186 0.045 0.53 0.72
Skewness 0.33 0.921 2.360 0.287 0.19 0.06
Kurtosis 1.93 3.239 11.960 2.390 3.046 1.87
Sum 54.5 1.850 11.730 2.910 39.83 68.67
Sum Sq. Dev. 4.45 0.040 1.140 0.066 9.31 17.2
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34





Series CI FDC1 FDC2 FDC3 BQ LOR
CI 1
FDC1 0.061 1
FDC2 0.306 0.338 1
FDC3 0.184 0.764 0.316 1
BQ 0.568 0.117 0.209 0.176 1
LOR 0.087 0.217 0.420 0.1370 0.182 1
Source:Authors’ computation using EViews 10
Table 4.
ADF unit root test
for stationarity
Series ADF test statistic ADF test statistic
Level 5% CV Order 1st diff 5% CV Order
CI 2.066 3.558 3.918 3.558 I (1)
FDC1 2.607 3.540 4.792 3.548 I (1)
FDC2 2.308 3.540 6.518 3.544 I (1)
FDC3 3.675 3.540 I (0)
BQ 2.633 3.540 4.711 3.563 I (1)
LOR 2.356 3.540 4.521 3.558 I (1)
Source:Authors’ computation using EViews 10
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The ARDL results reported in Table 6 reveal that the computed F-statistics for testing the
joint null hypothesis that the coefficients of the level variables in the ARDL model is zero
(meaning there exist no long-run relationship among them) is 8.8109. This value lies above
the critical upper value bounds at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively.
This reveals that there exists a long-run relationship between the dependent variables and
the explanatory variables. Thus the null hypothesis which states that there is no co-
integration among the variables is rejected.
The estimates of the long-run coefficients based on the ARDL model specified in
equation (3) are reported in Table 7. In the model, simultaneous decentralization of revenue
and expenditure (FDC3) and LOR are not significant at all levels. FDC1 is statistically
significant at 5% level while FDC2 and BQ are statistically significant at 1% level. FDC1
Table 5.
ADF unit root test
for structural breaks
Series Level 1st Diff 5% CV Order
CI 11.199 5.176 I (1)
D (FDC1) 3.871 6.855 5.176 I (1)
D (FDC2) 4.570 8.506 5.176 I (1)
D (FDC3) 4.996 8.143 5.176 I (1)
BQ 67.855 5.176 I (0)
LOR 15.433 5.176 I (0)






*Critical value bounds of the F-statistic Lower bound Upper bound





Notes: Case: intercept and trend; number of regressors (K) = 5; and *crtitical value bounds of the F-statistic
are from Pesaran et al. (2001)







Selected model –ARDL (1,1,1,0,1,0)
Variable Coefficient p-value
FDC1 4.787** (2.079) 0.049
FDC2 2.126* (6.074) 0.000
FDC3 0.652 (0.404) 0.690
BQ 0.639* (6.871) 0.000
LOR 0.026 (0.361) 0.722
Notes: * Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level
Source:Authors’ computation using EViews 10
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and FDC2 have a significant positive relationship with CI; this means that revenue and
expenditure decentralization will increase corruption significantly. On the contrary, FDC3
has an insignificant negative relationship with CI; this means that simultaneous
decentralization of revenue and expenditure will reduce or mitigate corruption
insignificantly in the long run.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the error correction coefficients for the model associated
with the long-run estimates. The estimated ECM provides information on the short-run
relationship among the dependent variable (CI) and the independent variables. In the model
with the exception of FDC1, the remaining explanatory variables are individually
statistically significant indicating that meaningful short-run impact is also generated by
these explanatory variables on corruption (CI). The error correction coefficients ecm(1) for
the model has the expected negative sign and lies between the usual range of 0 and 1. The
speed of adjustment is0.462 suggesting that about 46% of errors generated in each period
are automatically corrected by the system in the subsequent period.
Table 9 reports the diagnostic checks for the Model 1 using the histogram normality test,
Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier test and the Breusch–Pagan–
Godfrey heteroskedasticity test to check for normality, serial correction and
heteroskedasticity in the results. It is expected that the probability value must not be
significant at the level of 5% to conclude that the errors are normally distributed and that
there is no autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the results. In Table 9, the results reveal
that the probability values for the three tests are greater than 5%. Therefore we can
conclude that for the study model, the errors are normally distributed, and autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity are not present in the regressionmodel.
5. Discussion
The findings from this study adequately address the research objectives set. The aim of the
study was to find out the relationship between fiscal federalism and accountability in





Selected model –ARDL (1,1,1,0,1,0)
Dependent variable: D (CI) Coefficient Std error p-value
C 0.027 (1.814) 0.015 0.083
D (FDC1) 0.848 ((1.603) 0.529 0.123
D (FDC2) 0.679 (5.904) 0.155 0.000
D (FDC3) 0.693 (7.787) 0.089 0.0000
D (BQ) 0.099 (3.357) 0.042 0.027
ecm (1) 0.462 (8.030) 0.058 0.000
Notes: R2 = 0.744; Adj. R2 = 0.707; S.E. of regression = 0.083; F-statistic = 20.324; and DW-statistic = 1.620
Source:Authors’ computation using EViews 10
Table 9.
Post estimation test
Test carried out Jarque–Bera value Obs. *R2 p-value
Normality 0.727 0.695
Serial correlation 2.606 0.272
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 11.277 0.257
Source:Authors’ computation using EViews 10
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mitigate corruption in the long and short run. The findings from the study have several
policy implications which will be useful for policymakers, academicians and researchers in
this study area.
Lack of accountability poses serious threat to fiscal operations in Nigeria and many
developing countries. The nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations and the methods of
handling and managing public revenue and expenditure in a multi-tier government which
are critical for accountability provide the motivation for this study. Previous studies on
Nigeria have focussed more on fiscal federalism and economic growth and development
(Ubogu, 1982; Ewetan, 2011; Philip and Isah, 2012; Ewetan et al., 2016; Aigbokhan, 1999;
Anyanwu, 1999). This study fills the gap in the literature on the role fiscal federalism can
play in addressing the challenge of accountability in a multi-tier government.
The major finding in this study is that in the long run, the three measures of fiscal
decentralization had different impact on CI used to proxy accountability. While revenue
decentralization (FDC1) and expenditure decentralization increased corruption significantly,
on the contrary, simultaneous decentralization of revenue and expenditure (FDC3) reduced
corruption insignificantly. Specifically 1% increase in revenue decentralization (FDC1) and
expenditure decentralization (FDC2) will significantly increase corruption by 4.787% and
2.126%, respectively, while 1% increase in simultaneous decentralization of revenue
and expenditure (FDC3) will reduce corruption by 0.652% insignificantly. The overall
conclusion is that in the long run, fiscal decentralization increased corruption and does not
promote accountability significantly in Nigeria. This finding agrees with Bojanic (2018) and
Fisman and Gatti (2002) that decentralization leads to corruption especially at subnational
level of governance in developing countries. This finding also supports the conclusion of
Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may be more common at the local level
than at the national level which is the major reason adduced by opponents of fiscal
decentralization in developing countries. However this finding contradicts Innocents (2011),
Agyemang-Duah et al. (2018), Arif and Ahmad (2018), Ewetan et al. (2015a), Meloche and
Vaillancourt (2015), Zegras et al. (2013), Gurgur and Shah (2002), Huther and Shah (1998),
Arikan (2004) and De Mello and Barenstein (2001) that fiscal decentralization reduces
corruption and promotes greater public sector accountability and government
responsiveness to the needs of people in its jurisdiction. The implication of the inability of
fiscal decentralization to promote accountability in the long run is that government must
adopt appropriate policies to improve BQ, which promoted corruption significantly at 5%
level, and strengthen LOR, which reduced corruption insignificantly in this study.
For fiscal decentralization to mitigate corruption, deliberate policies must be adopted to
strengthen intergovernmental fiscal system and institutionalize accountability in
government fiscal operations at all tiers of government. These policies will ensure that fiscal
institutions use their limited funds to deliver optimal level of local and national public goods
and services to promote accountability and drive growth and development (Osabuohien
et al., 2018).
6. Conclusion and recommendations
The study examined the extent to which fiscal federalism had mitigated the challenge of
accountability in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the study used the ARDL method and
time series data from 1981 to 2017. The study found that fiscal decentralization failed to
mitigate corruption in the long run in Nigeria because of poor BQ and ineffective LOR. The
policy implication of this finding is that for fiscal decentralization to promote accountability
and mitigate public sector corruption in the long run in Nigeria, it must be accompanied
with appropriate policies to improve BQ, and further strengthen LOR. The finding also
JMLC
suggests that to promote public sector accountability in Nigeria, government should ensure
the simultaneous decentralization of expenditure and revenue to lower tiers of government.
This study provides detailed empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization without
accountability will accentuate public sector corruption and in the long run weakens local
economic development initiative to boost growth and development.
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